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We suggest an approach to study hierarchy, especially hidden one, of complex networks based on
the analysis of their vulnerability. Two quantities are proposed as a measure of network hierarchy.
The first one is the system vulnerability V . We show that being quite suitable for regular networks
this characteristic does not allow one to estimate the hierarchy of large random networks. The
second quantity is a relative variance h of the system vulnerability that allows us to characterize
a ”natural” hierarchy level of random networks. We find that hierarchical properties of random
networks depend crucially on a ratio δ between the number of nodes and the number of edges. We
note that any graph with a transitive isometry group action (i.e. an absolutely symmetric graph) is
not hierarchical. Breaking such a symmetry leads to appearance of hierarchy.
PACS numbers: (89.75.-k); (89.75.Fb); (89.75.Hh)
Introduction. It is a traditional feeling that any prac-
tical complex system (network) bears, at some degree, a
hierarchical property, which means that different parts
(elements, clusters, etc.) of the system have different im-
pact on the system performance. The very existence of
hierarchy in the system can be both explicit and implicit
which do not necessarily coincide; implicit hierarchy can
even prevail over the explicit one, as is the case e.g. with
”gray cardinal” who can be really much more powerful
than the king. Intuitively, it seems that the higher de-
gree (the number of connections to the others) a vertex
has, the higher position it occupies in the system hier-
archy. Such type of hierarchy we call explicit hierarchy.
However, there are situations when vertices with maxi-
mal number of edges are not necessarily most vital for the
system performance. For instance, all vertices in a binary
tree have equal degree, while there is strong hierarchy, i.e.
the importance of a particular vertex is dictated by the
level it seats on: the vertices which are closer to a root
are more important than those lying far from the root.
Such type of hierarchy we will refer to as a hidden hi-
erarchy. In this letter we suggest a quantitative way to
recover a system hierarchy, especially implicit one, using
the system vulnerability properties.
The idea to relate the hierarchy and the vulnerability
of the system was inspired by a very simple reason that
the more damage can be caused by removal of a particu-
lar vertex, the higher position in hidden hierarchy of the
system this vertex occupies, and vice versa. As a rough
hierarchy measure we suggest a pointwise version of the
system vulnerability introduced by Latora and Marchiori
[1], which is quite suitable for the hierarchy characteriza-
tion of regular systems. We will compare and classify var-
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ious regular networks with respect to their hierarchy. As
it will be demonstrated, the resulting hierarchical prop-
erties can be quite different from an intuitive hierarchy.
For randomized networks the above described approach
turned out to be ineffective, therefore in order to quan-
tify the hierarchy of random networks we use statistical
properties of the vulnerability which are quite sensitive
to the degree of hierarchy. It will be shown that there
exists a ”natural” level of hierarchy in randomized net-
works depending upon the ratio between the number of
vertices and the number of edges in the system.
We define a pointwise vulnerability V (i) of the net-
work as relative drop in performance after removal of i-
th vertex together with all edges connecting it with other
vertices, namely
V (i) =
E − E(i)
E
. (1)
Here E = 1
N(N−1)
∑
i6=j
1
dij
is the global efficiency [2] of
the network, N is the total number of vertices in the
network, dij is the minimal distance (either weighted or
unweighted) between the i− th and j − th vertices, and
E(i) is the network efficiency after removal of i−th vertex
and all its edges. Maximal value V of V (i) corresponds
to the network vulnerability introduced by Latora and
Marchiori [1]. As it was mentioned above, we suggest
to classify vertices of the network by the level of their
vulnerability V (i). This seems to be a natural way to
introduce an hierarchy in any network by relating it to
an ordered distribution of vertices with respect to their
vulnerability V (i). The most vulnerable vertex occupies
the highest position in the system hierarchy.
To illustrate our approach we have calculated the vul-
nerability of several typical topologically different kinds
of networks: a tree-like, torus-like, ring-like, “bush”-
like, and “spider”-like networks, which are schematically
shown in Fig.1. The resulting vulnerability distributions
ρ are presented in Fig.2.
2FIG. 1: Regular networks: a) torus-like, b) ring-like, c)
spider-like, d) bush-like, e) tree-like.
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FIG. 2: Vulnerability distributions for some regular networks.
Two types of the considered systems, the torus-like and
the ring-like, are not hierarchical, which is caused by ex-
istence of transitive action of an isometry group on these
networks. In other words, any vertex can be moved to
any position by a suitable one-to-one isometrical transfor-
mation. As a consequence, all vertices in these networks
have the same level of vulnerability, i.e. V (i) = const.
We will call any network with a transitive action of isom-
etry group an absolutely symmetric network. The vul-
nerability distributions in such networks degenerate into
a single point as can be seen in Fig.2 for both the ring
and the torus-like cases. Obviously, these systems are
not hierarchical as all their vertices have equal impact
on overall performance.
From this point of view absolute symmetry and hierar-
chy are mutually excluding properties.
In contrast to absolutely symmetric networks, the
spider-like networks have as strong as possible hierar-
chy, as the removal of a central vertex gives rise to a
complete destruction of the network. Quantitatively it
means that the vulnerability V of such system equals to
one. The vulnerability distribution in this case consists
of two points (see Fig.2), one of which corresponds to
a central vertex with V = 1, while the second point is
related to all other vertices with small value of Vi. No-
tice that the symmetry of a spider-like system is broken
only in a single point, the central one. This prompts us
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FIG. 3: Vulnerability of regular networks as a function of
system size.
to conclude that the level of symmetry is not directly
related to the level of hierarchy. Indeed, the spider-like
network is both quite symmetric and highly hierarchical,
but it is not absolutely symmetric. It seems that interre-
lation between symmetry and hierarchy is not so simple.
The last two examples shown in Fig.2, the tree-like and
the bush-like ones, demonstrate another possible type of
hierarchy.
Our concept of hierarchy essentially differs from that
proposed by Trusina et al [3]. According to their def-
inition the bush-like network (Fig.1d) is maximally hi-
erarchical, while the tree-like one (Fig.1e) is maximally
antihierarchical. However as one can see on Fig.2, both
these kinds of networks have quite similar hierarchical
properties. Moreover, intuitively the tree-like networks
represent typically hierarchical systems.
It is interesting to follow the dependence of vulnera-
bility upon the network size (graph order). Such depen-
dencies for regular networks are shown in Fig.3 for the
spider, an ideal network (in which all pairs of vertices
are connected) and a binary tree. The first two exhibit
opposite behavior. The spider-like graph has maximal
vulnerability V = 1 at any size. On the other hand, the
vulnerability of the ideal network tends to zero as the
number of vertices grows. The vulnerability of any other
network is positioned between the vulnerability values of
the spider-like and of the ideal networks of the same size,
because any graph is a subgraph of the complete one.
This fact is illustrated by the example of binary tree (see
Fig. 3).
So far we have considered non-random models of net-
works. Now we will turn to randomized versions of net-
works and look what happens with the vulnerability V
under randomization of the system. To randomize a net-
work we use the standard procedure of rewiring randomly
chosen pairs of vertices [4] (note that (i) even a subtle
difference in randomization procedure may result in es-
sentially different system behavior, as discussed in [5];
(ii) our procedure is not restricted by quite strong con-
dition of preserving the degree of every individual ver-
tex [3]). At the next step the vulnerability distribution
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FIG. 4: Vulnerability distribution for randomized torus-like
network.
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FIG. 5: Vulnerability of randomized networks as a function
of system size.
ρ is calculated for every single realization, afterwards a
distribution < ρ > of the random network is obtained
by averaging ρ over all statistical realizations. Now the
vulnerability V of the randomized network can be intro-
duced in the same way as it has been done earlier for
regular systems. The only difference is that now V is
defined from the distribution < ρ > rather than from ρ.
As an example the distribution < ρ > for randomized
spider-like graph is presented in Fig.4. This distribu-
tion has two essential differences from those for regular
networks (compare with Fig.2): (i) all vulnerability val-
ues are within quite narrow range, (ii) all vertices have
different vulnerability values V (i) in contrast to the reg-
ular graphs where very large groups of vertices may have
the same value of V (i). The vulnerabilities of totally
randomized counterparts of the spider-like, the torus-like
and the ideal networks are plotted in Fig.5 as functions
of the system size. Surprisingly, all three curves tend to
zero with system size growing to infinity, without any
distinction between so different kinds of network. Thus
the asymptotic behavior of regular structures is entirely
different than that of their totally randomized counter-
parts. To follow this drastic change we have calculated
the vulnerability V of the same networks gradually in-
creasing the degree of randomization p, i.e. the fraction
of randomly rewired pairs of vertices from zero to one. As
one can see from Fig.6, the impact of randomization on
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
 
 
Degree of randomization p
V
ul
ne
ra
bi
lit
y 
V
(p
)
 Ideal
 Spider
 Tree
FIG. 6: Vulnerability of randomized networks as a function
of randomization degree p.
the vulnerability depends crucially on the initial network
structure. Being essentially different at no randomization
limit p = 0 which corresponds to the regular case (see
Fig.3), all three types of networks become indistinguish-
able at the totally random limit p = 1. We conclude that
the vulnerability V (i) is not a suitable structural char-
acteristic of random networks because from this point of
view large random networks are not hierarchical at all,
which seems to be doubtful.
As it was already mentioned, the value < V > of the
mean vulnerability may also be used to characterize the
network hierarchy level. However this quantity also tends
to zero with decrease of the system size, as well as the vul-
nerability V . Generally, both the mean and the maximal
parameter values are very rough characteristics of large
random systems. For example, the mean ocean level is
constant. From this point of view the ocean is rather
homogeneous system without any hierarchy. However
this is not correct as there are always highly hierarchical
storm regions. Another example is the mean tempera-
ture of patients in a hospital that tells nothing about
the local situations. To obtain more detailed description
one has to use other parameters which are more sensi-
tive to deviations from the mean value, as it is usual for
statistics. As such additional parameter we introduce a
relative variance h of the pointwise vulnerability Vi as a
measure of a random network hierarchy:
h =
< ∆V 2 >
< V >2
, (2)
where V stands for the vulnerability of a single statistical
realization of the network, < ∆V 2 >= 1
N
∑N
i=1(V (i)− <
V >)2, and < V >= 1
N
∑N
i=1 Vi is the mean pointwise
vulnerability. The parameter h is a measure of the fluc-
tuation level and, as will be seen, can be used to describe
the hierarchical properties of both regular and random
networks. This means that in the case of ocean men-
tioned above wave intensities should be analyzed instead
of wave amplitudes in order to find the hierarchical struc-
ture.
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FIG. 7: Degree of hierarchy h of random networks as a func-
tion of the system size.
The dependence of h upon the system size for the ran-
domized versions of the spider-like, the torus-like, and
the ideal-like types of network is presented in Fig. 7. In
contrast to asymptotic behavior of the vulnerability V
that tends to zero at large size limit for all three net-
works, the asymptotic behavior of the relative variance
h exhibits a crucial difference for different types of net-
works. For the ideal network h → 0 which means that
the level of fluctuations remains extremely low despite
the total randomization of the network. The situation
changes drastically for the spider-like system where the
relative variance h grows with the system size and be-
comes even bigger than one for large enough systems, i.e.
the fluctuations are huge in spider-like systems. Again
we have two extreme situations, namely h → 0 for the
ideal and h ∼ 1 or bigger for spider-like random networks
(compare with Fig.3). The value of h for the randomized
torus is between these two extreme values.
What makes totally random networks of the same size
N so different? What is their “memory” about their non-
randomized parents? We believe that the role of such a
relict factor is played by the relative number of connec-
tions (edges), therefore to classify different types of ran-
dom networks according to asymptotic behavior of their
fluctuations h we introduce the ratio δ of the number of
vertices N to the number of edges. This quantity equals
to N/(N − 1) for the tree and the spider-like graphs and
δ = 2/(N − 1) for the ideal network. It should be noted
that the randomization procedure used here strictly pre-
serves δ. As it can be seen in Fig. 7, the level of fluctu-
ations characterized by the value of h increases with δ,
which is clear since the larger δ the lesser the number of
edges and so there are more options for randomization.
Thus, the relative variance h(δ) introduced above can be
used as the hierarchy measure for random networks.
Summary and discussion. We have introduced the vul-
nerability distributions for complex networks and used
them for studying the network hierarchical structure.
Such distributions are essentially different for different
types of networks and can be quite complicated for rig-
orous analysis. To estimate the hierarchy level of net-
works, both regular and random, we have used the fol-
lowing global characteristics: the network vulnerability
V and the relative variance h of the poitnwise vulner-
ability V (i). It has been demonstrated that the rela-
tive variance is a more delicate hierarchy characteristic
than the vulnerability, especially for random networks
in which the hierarchy level h depends crucially upon
the ratio δ of the number of vertices to the number of
edges. Any random network has its natural hierarchy
level h(δ) which is minimal for the ideal random network
with δ → 0 and is maximal for the spider-like random
network with δ ∼ 1 (strictly speaking, one can imag-
ine networks with the number of edges lesser than that
in the spider-like graph, i.e. δ > 1, but such networks
are disconnected, and this situation is beyond the scope
of this letter). This prompts us to make a more gen-
eral conclusion that stochasticity itself does not exclude
the presence of hierarchy, and any randomized system
can have some local islands with quite hierarchical struc-
tures. Complexity of such hierarchy islands is higher for
systems with restricted number of connections.
Our approach is fully applicable when a link hierar-
chy is of interest rather than hierarchy of vertices. Then
the quantity E(i) in eq.(1) would mean the network effi-
ciency after removal of i−th link, hence eq.(1) will define
a linkwise vulnerability [6]. Hierarchical structures based
on pointwise and linkwise vulnerabilities of the same net-
work can look entirely different. The obvious example is
the spider-like network where the pointwise based ap-
proach results in strongest possible hierarchy (V = 1),
whereas the linkwise vulnerability tends to zero in large
size limit, meaning that the there is no hierarchy of links
whatsoever.
Although all systems considered here are idealized
mathematical models, both regular and random ones, our
approach is applicable for analysis of the vulnerability V
and the degree of hierarchy h of any real network. Finally,
apart from V some other hierarchy measures based upon
vulnerability distributions may be used, such as mean
vulnerability, the number of vulnerability levels, etc.
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